Aporia: Sex

by Jason Stotts

Aporia (Gr.) – a complicated philosophical problem, characterized by evidence that seems to support multiple positions.

In this Aporia I want to explore problems related to sex, exclusivity, meaningfulness, and a host of other issues related to sexual ethics. This is somewhat in preparation for my essay on swingers and somewhat just to help me clarify my own views (or perhaps to show me what I need to work on).

I want to point out that this is an essay where I am simply trying to sort out my thoughts and the nature of the problem, not necessarily take any definite position.That is: Do not assume that just because you can find me saying X in this essay, means that I actually believe X!

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Is meaningfulness a moral requirement for sex? For example, Ayn Rand says that “to a rational man, sex is an expression of self-esteem […] it is his response to his own highest values in the person of another.” (VoR, 54)This seems to indicate that sex should always be meaningful (a response to values). However, wouldn’t this be a dangerous principle to have? What if a man were to have sex with his wife simply for the pleasure of it and not thinking about their value to each other? Is this mitigated by the fact that marriage means that they are necessarily our each other’s highest values? Does marriage actually mean this? Is there a moral difference between when the couple has sex that is an expression of their great value to each other and when they simply have sex for pleasure? Is the marriage aspect confusing the analysis? What about a committed couple, who is not married, who sometimes has sex to express the depth of their value to each other and sometimes just for the physical sensation? Can we really say that it’s wrong to have sex that is not an expression of values? If we do, are we no different than the catholic church with its procreative standard and all of the contradictions that entails?

Perhaps we should revise the principle to something of the form: “one should only have sex with a person who embodies one’s value.” This, however, would open the door to having sex outside of a relationship. Is a relationship a moral necessity? Was Dagny wrong to have an affair with Rearden? I agree with Ayn Rand that the only moral problem here is Rearden’s dishonesty, his adultery, and that there was nothing wrong with them having sex outside of a relationship. So, it seems that as long as one is having sex with someone who embodies one’s values it is moral. Thus, for Objectivism, “pre-marital sex” is no sin. However, this could open the door to a person having sex with lots of people who shared his values; it could effectively open the door to a meaningful(?) form of promiscuity. This seems like a bad idea. After all, if one treats sex shallowly and not as an expression of values, one is going to have a hard time finding and maintaining love because one will not be able to use sex in order to unify with his lover as an expression of their values: it will simply be a pleasurable physical act. That is, it could degrade sex. What if the person was already in a long term committed relationship? Would he be able to have sex with other people outside of it? Clearly, that would be cheating and involve deception, lying to one’s partner, and broken promises. What if one’s partner agreed to it? For example, swingers do this. This would seem to get around the dishonesty part, but would it devalue sex? What if it didn’t, but the person would fall in love with other people? Wouldn’t that ruin the relationship? Is it possible to have sex with someone who shares your values and not have some feelings for them? Are romantic feelings and unity a necessary aspect of sex?

Let’s return to meaningfulness. If sex could be meaningful sometimes, does this mean it could be meaningless (only for pleasure) other times without it being immoral? It certainly seems like if it’s with one’s spouse, this would have to be the case. Unless one is willing to put forth the argument that even spouses who have sex that is not the pinnacle of their existence are being immoral. Implausible and rationalistic! Sometimes sex is just not good sex. Sometimes sex is just for pleasure or just to help one fall asleep or just because one’s partner wants to. These don’t seem to be immoral, certainly not within the context of a marriage. Does this mean that there are at least some times when non-meaningful sex can be moral. Yes. Would this be able to be extended to another person outside of a marriage, as in the case of swingers?

The biggest objection to promiscuous sex is that it devalues sex and will ultimately prevent one from having the best kind of relationship: one of trust, unity, and shared values. Does that fact that swingers have a committed primary relationship and have sex outside bypass this objection? It at least seems to. However, it also seems very plausible that this kind of relationship would be prone to falling apart. If one of the spouses found someone else who they enjoyed having sex with more or who was more attractive than their own partner, they might leave their partner. Swinging seems designed to prevent by it’s pre-coupled nature, at least in general. What about jealousy? It seems that many couples would be torn apart by jealousy. Perhaps it is only feasible for certain kinds of couples: those that are very committed, have good communication, and are open about what they want. However, it being feasible is not the same as it being moral. On the other hand, Objectivism is a morality of human life and if it does not cause harm (physical or psychological), it can’t be immoral. What about something that could cause harm? Does the morality depend on whether it “works”? That seems rather pragmatic, but perhaps not in the Jamesian way. It’s not that there wouldn’t be principles (and anti-principle is the essence of philosophical Pragmatism), but that it’s morality would be contingent on outcome. Maybe it’s the intention? However, Objectivism is certainly not deontological. Intention and outcome? It doesn’t seem possible to frame a principle that could accommodate both, at least not here. Perhaps the morality would be dependent on what kind of person was wanting to try it and whether they had the right kind of relationship: morality as hinged in necessary condition?

What if a couple could make it work: have a committed core relationship and still have sex with other people (swingers)? Perhaps the morality of it would be in the why they want to do this, their reasons for wanting to swing. Could there be such a thing as a good reason to want to do this?< I’ve heard a good analogical defense from a swinger that goes thus: “Deep conversation with another woman, and the pleasure that I get from this, does not make me love my wife less or want to talk to her less. Further, the fact that I sometimes desire to have a pointless chat and sometimes desire deep intellectual conversation does not devalue the deep conversation, but only serves to enhance it.” I find this argument plausible, but translating the analogy back into reality seems hard to do. While it’s easy to see what I want from talking with lots of people, to learn new things, to be exposed to new ideas, etc, and it’s clear that this wouldn’t make me want to talk to my wife less; it’s not clear that this can be mapped onto sex exactly without raising problems. For example, what does it say about a man who desires women other than his wife? Is it only natural or is it a sign that he doesn’t love his wife enough? If it’s natural and unavoidable, then perhaps forcing people into monogamy is unrealistic and the cause of the exceedingly high divorce rate in our country (above 50% now?). If so, then some idea like swinging could solve that problem and allow people to fulfill their sexual desires, while still giving them the safety and emotional intimacy of a committed relationship. The best of both worlds. However, what if it is indicative of a lack of commitment or a lack of love? Then supporting this kind of lifestyle would mean enshrining the very worst elements of humanity: deception, lack of self control, etc. What if humans sometimes need sex as a serious thing and other times as a form of play. After all, psychologists have done studies saying that humans need to “play” at all stages of their life for psychological health.

Is exclusivity necessary for meaningfulness? Ayn Rand had a meaningful relationship with her husband Frank and yet she was not sexually exclusive (Nathaniel Branden). Is this an instance of the philosopher falling short of the philosophy or a permissible action that is not covered in the philosophy. After all, nowhere in Objectivism does it say that sexual exclusivity is a moral necessity. It seems that Objectivism’s major emphasis is on shared values and rationally pursuing romantic interests. Furthermore, Ayn Rand never recanted her actions with Branden, although she did end up severing her relationship over intellectual dishonesty.

Aristotle has an argument for exclusivity (in the case of friendly love philia) that is based in whether one would have enough time for two serious lovers. He argues that one can only have a small number of close loves before one would have to dilute one’s love by spreading it thin through lack of time and resources. This seems plausible to me as an objection against polyamory, but it’s not clear that it is an objection against non-exclusive committed sexual relationships like the kind found among swingers.

Perhaps there is not a clear argument against non-exclusive sexual relationships (or perhaps I just haven’t thought of it yet), but does this mean that they are not an ideal? It could be that the committed exclusive couple is a more desirable position to be in than the committed non-exclusive couple. However, sub-optimality is not necessarily immorality and it may be that two people are perfect for each other and, yet, still desire to have sex with people besides their partners. I think this is particularly likely in the case where one or both of the partners is bisexual and, therefore, their partner cannot fulfill a certain part of their sexual desires. Perhaps the committed non-exclusive relationship even is the ideal for bisexuals: that way they can fulfill their need for intimacy and a committed relationship, while also being able to explore the full range of their sexuality. Even if this is the case, (open) bisexuals make up a small percentage of people and it’s not clear that it is ideal for non-bisexuals. Although, perhaps it is for people who feel like they can’t have just one sexual partner? Even in cases where committed non-exclusive relationships are the ideal, because of the people involved, do we walk right back into the problem of challenges to the primary relationship and it only be moral if it works? Perhaps that’s just the wrong criterion to judge the morality and it should be the reason that people are doing it.

Perhaps the most fundamental question is: What do you lose, when you lose exclusivity?

This makes me wonder whether exclusivity is not some kind of continuum. Perhaps all relationships are on a continuum of exclusivity with something like “permissiveness” being on one pole and something like “exclusiveness” on the other pole. (I know that you shouldn’t have the kind of continuum on one of the poles, but it’s a work in progress). At the extreme of permissiveness, you have the couple who has no boundaries for their relationship and they give their partner permission to have sex with anyone, fall in love with anyone, etc. At the extreme of exclusiveness, you have the overly jealous couple where the partner(s) keep each other from even talking to others. This needs some work, but it’s an interesting way to think about it.

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That’s all the more aporatic I’m going to be for now. Feel free to leave comments. Attack ideas if you want to, but remember that I’m not putting forth any positive positions here. Just trying to clear up some things.


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